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an Alternative Land Tenure
System
Growing citizen concern over the conversion
of farm land to more intensive uses, and about
the disappearance of family farms, has captured
the attention of numerous federal officials
.
Eleven federal agencies are currently pursuing
a national agricultural lands study, consti-
tuting a review and synthesis of all existing
studies of the changes in prime agricultural
land in this country. Secretary of Agriculture
Robert Bergland has called for a national
dialogue on the structure of American
agriculture. In ten public meetings, in 1979,
he listened to testimony of citizens regarding
land ownership, control, and tenancy; barriers
to entering and leaving farming; size of farms;
the role of technology ; returns to farmers;
costs to consumers , and many other critical
issues concerning the nature of rural life in
the United States. A report and recommendations
are forthcoming. These small steps reveal
concern at a level that may slow the unchecked
concentration of land ownership depicted below,
or at least may support and encourage alterna-
tive tenure systems such as the community land
trust.
The current land reform movement in the
U.S. seeks not only to change and control land
use, but further to change and control ownership
patterns. The economics of land ownership
determines in part its use--whether the land is
farmed or developed—and determines to a large
extent who is wealthy and who is poor. Current
patterns of land ownership in the U.S. have not
been thoroughly studied, and those reports
which have been produced are investigative
searches dependent on tax rolls and annual
reports with no support from the government
sector (Barnes, 1971). These preliminary
investigations have revealed staggering
statistics: it is likely that five percent of
the population owns nearly two-thirds of the
private property in America (Barnes, 1972).
This report, seven years old, does not reflect
the growing trend of foreign direct purchase
of American land, removing the land from the
people at a quickening rate.
One suggested reform is the establishment
of community land trusts, removing parcels of
land from the free market and placing them on
a stewardship for a larger common good. What
follows is a look at the development of the
concept of private ownership in the U.S., the
current situation, and the feasibility of
communal ownership as a successful reform.
DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
The extension of a person's right to land
beyond simply the right to use it derives from
imperial Rome (Sakolski, 1957). Traditional
notions of land ownership are quite different
from the American acceptance of individuals
(or corporations) accumulating more land than
they can use and then charging others for the
privilege of using it. African, ancient
Chinese, and American Indian cultures considered
the village or community the holder of land,
distributing it only as it was needed for use
(Bertrand and Corty, 1962).
With the emergence of the Roman Republic,
each citizen was granted a small parcel of land
as well as rights to the public domain. Wealthy
families began to amass the public land, and
military leaders were granted large tracts of
this land both in Rome and in conquered areas
throughout Europe. Eventually, small land-
owners could not compete with the landed aris-
tocrats and sold their land, creating even
wider social and economic disparities
(Sakolski, 1957).
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debate was not concerned with whether private
or public ownership would be explored; there
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was no doubt that individuals would be allowed
to own the land. One side of the debate,
most identified with Jeffersonian ideals,
favored distribution of small parcels to
settlers at no cost. The opposition favored
selling the land to settlers and speculators
alike (Sakolski, 1957). Unfortunately, the
wealthiest speculators were among the most
powerful politicians, and what ensued was the
distribution of millions of acres with no
regard for the individual.
The series of land frauds that took place
in the first half of the 19th century succeeded
in driving up land prices to the point that
people moving West could not afford to settle,
and set the stage for today's distribution of
land. The earliest of these frauds, known as
the Yazoo land frauds, allowed the Georgia
legislature to give away more than 30 million
acres to a group of land speculators (Patrick
Henry included) who then resold them at enor-
mous profit (Bertrand and Corty, 1962).
Henry Miller, a German immigrant who amassed
\k million acres in his lifetime, succeeded in
acquiring free from the government several
thousand acres of dry land under the Swamp Lands
Act of 1850. The Act made available to indivi-
duals free any "swamp land" only traversable by
boat, so Miller crossed his land by loading a
rowboat onto a wagon and having a team of
horses pull him across.
The timeliness of these frauds is realized
in the case of Lloyd Tevis and James Ben Al
i
Haggin, who received title to 150 square miles
of California's San Joaquin Valley by hiring
vagabonds to claim 640-acre parcels of land
under the Desert Land Act and then transferring
those claims to themselves. Although the fraud
was discovered, the lands were never returned,
and in 1 890 Haggin and Tevis incorporated the
land under the name of Kern County Land Company.
In 1936, oil was discovered under the land, and
rather than pay taxes on the oil earnings,
Kern County Land Company invested in tax-loss
farming. In 1967, Tenneco, an oi 1 -chemi cal
-
manufacturing-packaging- farming- land development
comglomerate bought the company, and although
Tenneco reported earnings of $73.8 million in
1970, it paid no federal income taxes that year,
and filed a tax credit of $20 million (Barnes,
1972).
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Realizing the rampant violations of the
Homestead Act must be stopped, Congress enacted
the Reclamation Act in 1902. This law provided
federal funds for irrigation of farmland only
if the owner resides on the land and owns less
"...IT IS LIKELY THAT FIVE PERCENT OF
THE POPULATION OWNS NEARLY TWO-THIRDS
OF THE PRIVATE PROPERTY IN AMERICA..."
than 160 acres. The low density of settlement
patterns made its enforcement difficult
initially, and enforcement of the 160-acre
limit continues to plague the Bureau of
Reclamation, as political pressure forced
relaxation of the regulations (Barnes, 1972).
In California, farmers' organizations are still
working to have this Act enforced and
implemented for small landholders (Markusen,
1979).
The social consequences of these historical
giveaways are the perpetuation of the current
pattern of land ownership, creating great dis-
parities of wealth and power between the landed
aristocracy and the small landowner. Eventually
the landless (powerless) rural people migrate
to the cities, unprepared for urban life, or
remain in poverty in their homelands. This
early land distribution farce set the stage for
the current corporate comglomerate 1 andownersh
i
p
in the U.S.
THE TREND CONTINUES
Blatant violations of laws are easily
identified, even if they are not easily
rectified. Today, political land giveaways to
favored landowners are much more subtle,
achieved through preferential tax treatment,
zoning changes, highway routing, and subsidies.
The tax system provides incentives for land
speculation in four ways. First, and probably
the most lucrative tax benefit, is the capital
gains tax. Under this loophole, profits from
the sale of real estate are taxed at approxi-
mately half the regular income tax rate. A
second tax break is the accelerated depreciation
clause. Real estate investors are allowed to
deduct from their taxable income the annual
depreciation of structures on their land
(Barnes, 1972). Most real estate investments
do not depreciate at all, so investors get a
double return on their investment at the expense
of the taxpayer.
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The oil depletion allowance, a tax break
for owners of oil, timber, coal, and other
mineral deposits, deprives the federal treasury
of up to $1 billion a year (Barnes, 1972).
Later it will be shown that a large percentage
of these lands are owned by a very few large
compan ies
.
The fourth tax break for land speculators
is the deduction of farm losses from non-farm
income. Again, as in the accelerated depletion
clause, although the land use is losing money,
the land value is increasing rapidly, and any
losses are returned in part through income tax
deductions (Barnes, 1972).
In addition to income tax provisions, pro-
perty taxes are also lower for large land-
holders, through the systematic underassessment
of corporate 1 andhold i ngs . In 1970,
a Vanderbilt University study reported that, in
Tennessee's five most productive coal counties,
"...Congress enacted laws throughout
the 1800s which allowed the acquisition
and perpetuation of large land holdings"
coal companies control one-third of the land
but pay less than k% of the property taxes.
In Georgia, in 1972, the state government paid
$2000 an acre for land owned by Union Camp that
had been assessed at $20 an acre (Barnes, 1972).
The list of extralegal underassessments is
endl ess.
Some tax policies have legalized undei
—
assessment. In 1966, the California legislature
enacted the Williamson Act, a law to preserve
prime agricultural land by reducing property
taxes on the land, the idea being that lower
taxes would keep the farmer from having to sell
out to developers. A 1972 study by the
California State Board of Equalization revealed
that 26% of the 9.5 million acres benefitting
from the Williamson Act are owned by twelve
corporations (Barnes, 1972).
The social welfare implication of under-
assessment is that the wealth of rural areas
is being siphoned away by absentee-owner
corporations. The corporations are not rein-
vesting their profits in the region, largely
because the company's base is usually not where
their farmlands are, and they are not even
paying enough property taxes to support public
facilities (primarily schools) (Barnes, 1972).
Corporations generally use migrant farm labor,
who do not pay taxes or spend their money in
the region either.
Another area of government policy which,
although intended for the small farmer, actually
benefits the corporate landholder is the subsidy
program for not growing crops. Originally, the
subsidies were to prevent the small farmer from
being forced off the land by rising costs and
lower prices. Yet this program, too, has
backfired. The wealthiest seven percent of
farms receive k0% of the benefits of the subsidy
(Casalino and Barnes, 1972). When Congress set
a $55,000 limit in subsidy, many corporations
subdivided into dummy subsidiaries to receive
full benefit (Barnes, 1972).
THE CURRENT DISTRIBUTION OF LAND
The combination of government support for
corporate ownership of rural land and the cor-
porations' ability to manage around the law has
created the conglomerated land holding situation
today. Activities requiring large tracts of
land for success have been industrialized by
large U.S. and multinational corporations.
Agriculture, timber, energy, and land develop-
ment profits are all concentrated in the hands
of a few large landowners.
TIMBER
Non-local timber companies are the largest
landowners and largest industrial employers
Clumber, pulp, and paper), as well as the
largest polluters in the South.' Often the
single company in a rural town, they enjoy low
wages, low taxes, and no unions. Other timber
dependent states are under the control of the
same corporations; in Maine over one-half of
the state's land area is controlled by five
large timber companies and their subsidiaries.
The top twelve corporations control over half
the total timber industry acreage in the U.S.
In addition to their corporate holdings, the
"multiple use" criterion of national forests
have set aside 186 million acres of public
forestlands for use by the timber companies,
although in theory recreation, wildlife, and
watershed protection are equally considered.
The large get larger in the timber industry
--Georgia-Pacific acquired sixteen smaller
companies from I960- 1 970--and the government
encouraged this growth in each company through
the capital gains tax. Additionally, with the
increasing technological shift of the timber
production industry, to tree farming (planting
trees like crops) and mechanized harvesting,
individuals will soon be unable to compete
in the timber market.
ENERGY
Although the exact holdings of oil companies
cannot be determined, domestic oil holdings of
the largest companies total over 64 million
acres. Beyond oil, the largest twenty oil com-
panies own 60% of U. S. natural gas reserves.
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Over thirty of the top fifty coal companies are
oil subsidiaries, and oil companies control
over half the available uranium reserves. These
corporations are beginning to buy failing solar
companies as well, in an attempt to gain com-
plete control of all energy supplies, termed
"vertical integration."
The grim reality of energy production can
be seen in Appalachia, where fossil fuel mining
is a billion dollar endeavor annually. Yet the
residents of Appalachia remain poor and totally
controlled by the mines, which jeopardize their
land, their homes and their health.
LAND DEVELOPING
Many of the major corporations are putting
their land holdings to use in residential
development. "The solution to the problems of
a city," according to the president of the ITT
Community Development Corporation (Barnes,
1972), "is to have someone enlightened own it
and control it." Large corporations, feeling
enlightened, are attempting to develop (and
control) their own cities. ITT is developing
the city of Palm Coast on 100,000 acres of
Florida's shore; Standard Oil is involved in
four communities developing near Houston;
Gulf Oil has begun developing new towns in
five states.
Land development is a good investment to
avoid inflation, taxes, and the development of
stockpiles of old money, and also reaps great
profits. Even under the guise of developing
wel
1
-planned, pleasant living situations, the
corporations have created sterile uniform sub-
urban development (like Levittown and Reston)
that allows them to maintain control over their
expanses of undeveloped land as well. More
subtly and even less tested is how deliberately
the corporate developers are creating uniform
living environments, encouraging the American
public's dependence on the products of the
corporations, and increasing their control over
the American lifestyle.
Conglomerates such as Standard Oil, Boeing,
Dow Chemical, Goodyear, Union Carbide, and
Tenneco are all investing in agribusiness, with
the blessings of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture. The USDA claims larger corporate
farms enjoy more economic efficiency in food
production. Yet in 1967, J. Patrick Madden,
a USDA economist, reviewed 1 38 studies of farm
production costs and found that mechanized one-
and two-Derson farms, in all studies under
1000 acres, were repeatedly more efficient
(Barnes, 1975). Efficiency aside, corporate
farms can afford to lose money on farming and
often desire a loss for tax purposes discussed
above. A small farmer, living off his or her
farm income, seems on paper to have a less eco-
nomical operation than the large corporation's
farming efforts. A small farmer simply cannot
compete.
Aside from the tax incentives for corpora-
tions to invest in farmland, speculation is a
profitable reason for buying agriculture land.
Dun's Review put it aptly: "The kicker in many
agri-deals is the hope that a suburb or a
recreation development will sprawl its way."
(Casalino and Barnes, 1972).
Some of the corporate farmers have a real
interest in farm production, hoping to develop
integrated "total food systems." Tenneco,
originally an energy company and among the top
fifty corporations in the U.S., is attempting
"...THE KICKER IN MANY AGRI-DEALS
IS THE HOPE THAT A SUBURB OR A RECREA-
TION DEVELOPMENT WILL SPRAWL ITS WAY."
to control a selection of fruits and vegetables
"from seedling to supermarket." The company
purchased the Kern County Land Company in 1971
(1.8 million acres) and Heggbl ade-Margul eas
,
the largest fresh produce distributor in the
U.S. Combine these purchases with Tenneco's
Packaging Corporation of America, farm machinery
corporation (J . I . Case Company), oil and
chemical subsidiaries, and the largest date
processing plant in the country, and they have
essentially cornered the market (Barnes, 1972).
AGRICULTURE
In 1950, there were 5 .^ million farms in
the U.S., the average size being 215 acres.
That situation changed in the next decade to
^.6 million farms, averaging 302 acres (Bertrand
and Corty, 1962). By 1970, there were only
2.9 million farms, the average being 380 acres.
An article in the Wall Street Journal on May 11,
1972 estimated that 1 670 small family farms
were being sold per week. The largest 2% of
farms (approximately ^0,000) accounted for over
one-third of farm sales in 1969 (International
Independence Institute, 1972).
The implications of this change in the
pattern of farm holdings in simple economic
terms are explicit: to start a farm that costs
$500 in 1940 now has capital costs of $12,000,
not including interest payments and assuming
an individual can secure a loan of that
magnitude. One of the major contributors to
this exponential jump in farm start-up costs is
the increasing technological dependency of
agricultural production. Agriculture technology
is not only capital intensive (machines,
buildings, and chemicals), but is also concerned
with the hybridization of plants and animals and
new techniques such as crop rotation and con-
touring which are labor-intensive. The shift
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toward increasing use of technology also implies
a theoretical increase in the amount of land
available to a farmer as productivity per acre
increases. This increase in productivity per
acre as a result of increasing technology nets
a decrease in the actual number of people em-
ployed on farms.
As agriculture becomes more mechanized and
-intinues to be dominated by the corporations
with the capital, the family farmer is effec-
tively driven off his or her land. Many have
migrated to urban areas. Some continue to sub-
sist in poverty on land that has been in their
family for decades. A few farmers are prole-
tarianized by large corporate farms, continuing
to farm but having no stake in the land
(International Independence Institute, 1972).
A growing number of small farmers are supple-
menting their incomes with off-farm jobs.
Using the I960 statistics again, J>h% of employed
men and 61% of employed women living on farms
were engaged in nonagr i cul tural jobs. These
percentages are an increase from 17% of men and
52% of women in 1 9^0 (Bertrand and Corty, 1962).
The option for men and women to gain indepen-
dence from the current industrialized American
lifestyle is rapidly becoming an economic
imposs i bi 1 i ty
.
Unfortunately, my limited research has
found no sociological studies of the problems
of farm residents who are forced to live in
bleakest poverty as a result of corporate
hoarding of land, forced to sell the land their
family has farmed for generations, or forced
to move or work in the city. Most social
science researchers are preoccupied with the
urban environment, where large numbers of
unhappy people at high densities create health,
safety, and satisfaction problems for the
ruling class. The urban rich cannot avoid
being affected by the urban poor as easily as
they can forget the plight of the small farmer,
Tsolated many miles away. This preoccupation
with the city on the part of both researchers
and government agencies has allowed the
unchecked amassing of much of the remaining
rural land in the U.S., as small farmers then
are integrated into the urban problem.
AN ALTERNATIVE
The community land trust concept is an
attempt to separate land from those things
classified as property and to consider it as
trusterty. According to Ralph Borsodi, a foun-
der of the land trust movement, property is
created by people through their labor, and can
be owned and exchanged. Trusterty is land,
water resources, natural forests, and mineral
resources--essent i a 1
1
y that which was not
created by people and should not be owned by
individuals (Borsodi, 1968). Robert Swann,
director of the Institute for Community
Economics and the National Community Land Trust
Center, proposes that any trusterty which is
held at all should be held as a common trust,
under the control of the entire community
(international Independence Institute, 1972).
Within this theoretical framework, the
actual land trust is a legal entity, generally
a private nonprofit corporation, that acquires
land by gift or purchase to be held for an
unlimited duration. Proponents of land trust
do not consider government intervention to
nationalize land the most feasible nor the most
effective method of acquiring land. In the
1930s, the Federal Resettlement Administration
tried land trusts, which were unsuccessful for
basically two reasons. First, land trusts were
initiated and administered by the FRA rather
than as a response to public demand. Second,
the politics of government control of land
placed too much pressure on the FRA, so the
program never got off the ground ( I nterna t i-onal
Independence Institute, 1972).
Once the land is acquired, the trustees
determine what parts of the land trust are of
interest to the community as a whole, such as
mineral resources or water. The remainder of
the land is divided and leased to members of
the trust. The individuals or families
involved generally sign a long-term renewable
lease, and pay annually approximately 2-1% of
the cost of the land. I n" some instances the
leases are inheritable and guarantee the same
rights and security a landowner typically
enjoys. The exceptions are that the lessee
must be in residence on the land and that the
lessee cannot exchange the land or the lease
on the open market, but must deal with the
other trustees.
The problems of urban crowding and corporate
control of the U.S. economy are easily recog-
nized and often debated, yet few analyses
question the American system of private land
tenure. Modification of the system which allows
a few wealthy individuals and corporations to
collect land in absentee ownership is the first
step toward a more equitable distribution of
wealth. The community land trust is an insti-
tutional, legal, alternative form of land tenure
that may provide a means to achieve this new
d i str i but ion.
The trust is administered by members of the
community, and a variety of forms of governing
are presently used. Income from the leases can
be used to purchase more land or to help other
groups begin their own trusts. The community
also decides generally the acceptable uses of
the land.
USE OF LAND TRUSTS: URBAN APPLICATIONS
How the land is used makes community land
trusts different from conservation trusts such
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as the Nature Conservancy, whose land trusts
are specifically to preserve special areas.
Community land trusts encourage development
that seeks to meet both the economic and social
needs of a larger community. Generally,
community land trusts are developed as either
solely residential communities or residential/
agricultural communities; these forms will be
discussed in greater depth below. There is,
however, potential for urban land trusts as
well. The National Urban Land Program of the
Trust for Public Land focuses on inner-city
vacant lots (an estimated 20,000 in Philadelphia,
1(5,000 in New York, and 100,000 in Lcs Angeles),
acquiring these bits of land and bringing them
under community control. The interested resi-
dents form a committee, and eventually an auto-
nomous corporation to take the land titles.
Projects to date have been developed as
community gardens and parks or cleared and
planted as open space with future plans for
use (Blackmore, 1978).
In Rockville, Maryland and St. George,
Vermont, the municipalities have assumed title
to land which normally would be sold for taxes.
In Rockville, forty acres of industrial develop-
ment is planned, the land being leased rather
than sold to developers. The city then has
more direct control over the use of the land
than zoning could provide (International
Independence Institute, 1972). Local govern-
ments, then, could act as a trustee when land
is newly developed, retaining title to the land
and monitoring its development. Edgardo Contini
(1972) suggested the concept of "land dedicated
to urban development as a public utility, owned
and administered by the community itself."
Community control through the local governing
body would be acceptable governmental interven-
tion to the proponents provided the trust is
administered by an independent public body.
Unless governments can be involved, widespread
use of community land trusts, particularly in
urban areas, may never materialize.
Most of these trusts, initiated by Robert
Swann's Institute for Community Economics, are
based on the Gramdan movement in India, which
set aside millions of acres for the landless
poor while Gandhi was in power. The basis for
New Communities, Inc., was to begin to provide
a land base for Georgia's rural black pop-
ulation. The articles of incorporation of the
North Carolina Land Trustees of America, Inc.,
include as a purpose to acquire land "to be
used by people who possess the abilities and
will to act as stewards of the land but who
lack capital resources."
THE SUCCESS OF THE MODEL
New Communities, Inc., is the most publi-
cized community land trust, the first one
organized around the Gramdan model. Begun ten
years ago, the farm is the largest black-owned
single-tract agriculture operation in the U.S.
Future plans include building residential
settlements, schools, and an industry base
(centering on the processing of farm products)
(Blackmore, 1978). They have the potential for
a self-sufficient new town, yet no private
property in the entire development.
Vermont's Earth Bridge Land Trust,
Virginia's Wartroot Trust, and the Oregon
Women's Land Trust are based on collective
agriculture efforts. Maine's Sam Ely Community
Services Corporation has concentrated on
leasing land to individuals for their own indi-
vidual efforts, whether farming or simple
residential, still preserving some common land
(Blackmore, 1978). In all cases, families who
would otherwise be forced to live in non-rural
settings near industrial jobs and where low-
cost housing is more abundant now have access
to land they can develop in accordance with the
community's wishes and their own desires, and
now may gain a measure of control over their
own 1 i ves
.
USE OF LAND TRUSTS:
RURAL APPLICATIONS
Rural agricultural land trusts are much
less complicated and more politically and
economically feasible than urban ones.
Generally, rural trusts can be accomplished with
less government involvement, and at a lower
cost than urban land. And at the present, while
rural land trusts can provide a residence and
a livelihood for members, urban land trusts are
smaller parcels which can only be used collec-
tively, making the rural areas an easier choice
for members, based on personal economics.
Rural land trusts occur at every scale,
from thirty acres to the 5700-acre New
Communities, Inc., in Lee County, Georgia.
An added benefit of community land trusts
is the variety of people attracted to them.
An unscientific survey of members of land
trust communities by John Blackmore (1978)
revealed a multiracial mix of all ages, all
economic levels, and all political ideologies.
Common to most are love of the land, desire to
have more control over how land is used, and
recognition that the government will not inter-
vene in the growing control of productive land
by large corporations. Few could have chosen
this lifestyle without the community land trust.
CONCLUSION
Although only a small amount of land is
currently held in trust, the existing community
land trusts show the viability of such a tenure
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For land trusts to be successful on a
nationwide basis would require large-scale
changes in the American political and economic
systems. The existing efforts, however, are
providing the disenfranchised and others access
to land and to a productive capacity that can
compete with corporate farming systems. They
may prevent the corporations from achieving
"vertical integration" of all food products;
that is, stop the control of every aspect of
production from "seedling to supermarket."
Economically, land trusts can influence
land prices in the adjacent region by either
leasing land on favorable terms (placing a
ceiling on prices) or holding back from the
market (putting a floor under prices). The
rental charges on leased land can also influ-
ence demographic patterns, if the trusts can
accommodate a significant proportion of the
popul at ion.
On a broader social level, land trusts and
the sharing of land encourages residents to
use a cooperative economic organization in
their other endeavors, familiarizing the
market- i ndoctr i nated Americans with other
economic systems. And without the motive of
profit, development decisions can be more
influenced by larger community objectives and
definitions of need not based solely on
economic gain.
The accepted planning solutions to urban
problems today focus on inner-city situations—
public housing projects, industrial jobs. To a
limited extent, through mechanisms such as the
community land trust, rural solutions may be
sought to urban problems. Making viable a
rural lifestyle may in fact circumvent some
problems which arise as rural residents are
forced into the city. Consideration of the
98% of the land area where densities are lower
may result in fewer urban problems directly,
as city-dwellers become able to take on a non-
urban lifestyle, and indirectly, as land trusts
slow the corporate takeover of rural land in
the U.S.
NOTES
The discussions of timber, energy, and land
developments draw totally on the research
of Peter Barnes and Larry Casalino, 1972,
Who Owns the Land?, published by the Center
for Rural Studies, San Francisco,
Cal i forn ia.
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